This paper derives a necessary condition for unanimous voting to converge to the perfect information outcome when voters are only imperfectly informed about the alternatives. Under some continuity assumptions, the condition turns out to be necessary and su cient for the existence of a sequence of equilibria that exhibits convergence to the perfect information outcome. The requirement is equivalent to that found by Milgrom 1979 to be necessary and su cient for convergence of the price to the true value of an object in a singleprize auction. An example illustrates that convergence to the right" decision may be reasonably fast for small electorates. However, if voters have common preferences, unanimity is not the optimal voting rule. Unanimity rule makes sense in the example only as a way to make sure that the viewpoint of a minority is respected. This paper is a follow up on previous joint work with John Duggan, who also contributed with comments to this paper. Nicola Persico suggested exploiting the analogy between unanimous voting and single-object auctions. I am grateful to both of them.
Introduction
A group of individuals must decide between two alternatives, A or C. Individuals might have di erent preferences over A and C. A possible decision rule is to select C if everybody agrees that C is a better alternative than A, and to select A otherwise. This decision rule makes sense in several real life situations. C may be an unusually risky alternative, or one carrying extraordinary moral consequences. An example is a jury decision about the death penalty in a criminal trial, in countries where this punishment is still possible. Another possibility is that A represents the status quo, so that C should be adopted only if it is Pareto improving. Individuals in the group might be representatives of a larger society, as in a parliamentary committee or a board of directors. Requiring unanimous consent in the group may be a way to ensure that the interests of minorities are taken into account if a signi cant departure from the status quo is being considered.
The appropriateness of unanimous consent as a decision rule is less clear if members of the group have common values with respect to some characteristic of the alternatives and are privately informed about this characteristic. In the jury example, jurors may h a ve di erent information about the extent of the responsibility of the defendant in a criminal act due to di erences in their perspectives and ability to judge the evidence available. In the committee example, committee members may have private information about the costs and bene ts of departing from the status quo. In both cases, what is in question is the ability of unanimous voting to aggregate information about the quality of the alternatives, so that C is adopted if it is really Pareto superior to A. From this perspective, two t ypes of mistakes are possible: To choose A even though everybody would favor C if all the private information were common knowledge, and to choose C if at least some member of the group would favor A if all the private information were common knowledge.
The literature on information aggregation in elections has shown that, under di erent non-unanimous voting rules, increasing the size of a committee typically leads to the decision of the committee to converge in probability to what it would have been were the true characteristic of the alternatives known to voters. This paper investigates whether this result applies in the case of unanimous voting.
We start our investigation in section 2 by setting up a model with a countable number of states or values of the unknown characteristic of the alternatives, with very little restrictions on what the preferences of di erent voters might be,and in which voters' private information takes the form of a signal generated by a countably-additive probability measure. This framework is much more general than those adopted by F eddersen and Pesendorfer 1998 and Duggan and Martinelli 1998, who study unanimous voting in the context of two states, common preferences among voters, and either two possible signals or a continuum of signals. The extra generality of the current paper is desirable because, as argued later on, common preferences is not the right assumption to judge unanimous voting. We also want to abstract from irrelevant details of the signal-generating process.
In section 3, a necessary condition for convergence is derived. It states that it must be possible for a voter to be arbitrarily sure that the characteristic of the alternatives favors voting for A, if it is actually the case that someone would like t o v ote for A were the true characteristic known to voters. Note that the requirement is only that it should be possible f o r a v oter to be arbitrarily sure; it is not required that a voter is perfectly informed with any positive probability. This condition is also su cient for the probability of choosing C by mistake to go to zero along every sequence of Nash equilibria. Interestingly, the condition is equivalent to that found by Milgrom 1979 to be necessary and su cient for convergence of the winning bid to the true value of an object in a single-prize auction.
In section 4, it is shown that, under some continuity assumptions, in a two-state model the requirement described in the previous paragraph is necessary and su cient for the existence of a sequence of equilibria along which the probabilities of both types of mistakes go to zero. This result is robust in the sense that, if the condition is nearly satis ed, then there is a sequence of Nash equilibria along which the probabilities of both mistakes get close to zero. A numerical example in section 5 illustrates that convergence to the right" decision may be reasonably fast for small electorates. However, if voters have common preferences, unanimity is not the optimal voting rule.
Some of these results contrast sharply with those obtained by Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998. We leave for the last section a discussion of the relation of this paper with previous literature on information aggregation in elections and auctions. Conditional on Z and under P, the signals are independent and identically distributed random variables. The de nitions of -eld, probability measure, and random variable are those of, say, Billingsley 1986. The social decision d is determined in an election in which the rst n voters participate. After receiving their signals, voters simultaneously cast a vote in favor of A or in favor of C. If all n voters vote for C, the social decision is C; otherwise the social decision is A. That is, unanimity is required in order to adopt C. In terms of the jury problem, which we use to illustrate the results, C represents conviction" and A represents acquittal." Given n, a strategy for a voter is an A-measurable mapping p ni : S ! f0; 1g, where p ni s i is the probability that voter i votes in favor of C. We consider only pure strategies; mixed strategies are easily incorporated by including in the signal space a dimension unrelated to Z and used for randomization.
The above formulation de nes a Bayesian game for every n. Given a sequence of Nash equilibria of the election game, indexed by n, we treat d n as a sequence of random variables. We are interested in nding conditions under which That is, with probability approaching one, A is adopted whenever an arbitrarily small fraction of voters would favor A if the state of the world were known, and C is adopted otherwise.
It turns out that the problem is similar to that of nding conditions such that the winning bid converges to the true value of the object at an auction, a problem studied by Wilson 1977 and Milgrom 1979 . The following condition is similar to that given by Milgrom 1979. We will say that P we obtain lim n!1 Pfd n = CjZ = z 0 g = 0 , a contradiction.
We Pfd n = CjZ = z c g = 1 :
We will use throughout the proof the fact that, We claim that p n1 ; : : : ; p nn is a Nash equilibrium pro le. To verify this, note that for every vector of strategies followed by other voters, it is a best response for each t ype-0 voter to adopt the proposed strategy. Suppose that every other voter behaves according to the proposed strategies; then, it is a best response f o r a t ype-1 voter to adopt the proposed strategy if q 1 PfpivjZ = z c gfsjz c P fZ = z c g r 1 PfpivjZ = z a gfsjz a P fZ = z a g for every s 2 S; s n for every s 2 s n 1 ; S. These two equations compare the expected payo of voting for conviction with the expected payo of voting for acquittal, conditional on receiving the signal s and on being pivotal. In these two equations, the term PfpivjZ = zg represents the probability that a single type-1 voter is pivotal, conditional on the strategies followed by the other voters and the state of the world. Under the proposed strategies, PfpivjZ = z c g = 1 , Fs n 1 jz c n 1 ,1 , PfpivjZ = z a g = 1 , Fs n 1 jz a n 1 ,1 :
But then the desired inequalities follow from the de nition of s n 1 and iii.
Finally, w e claim that lim n!1 Pfd n = CjZ = z c g = 1 along the sequence of Nash equilibrium n-tuples p n1 ; : : : ; p nn . To v erify this, from the de nition of s n 1 we obtain that, for large enough n, n 1 = 1 + log r 1 By convention, let s n 0 = S. For the rest of the proof, suppose that n is large enough so that n k 0 and s n k exists for all k 1. Now, for a given vector x n = x n 0 ; ; x n K of cuto strategies, with x n k 2 S; s n k , let y n begiven by Following the steps of the case K = 1, it is simple to prove that x n is in fact a Nash equilibrium pro le. Proof Consider the vector of cuto strategies given by s n 1 for k = 1 and S for every other k for n large enough. Here s n 1 is de ned as in the proof of Theorem 2. Under the proposed strategies, Pfd n = CjZ = z c g = 1 , Fs n 1 jz c n 1 ; Pfd n = CjZ = z a g = 1 , Fs n 1 jz a n 1 :
The limits in the statement of this Theorem are obtained from equation 3 in the proof of Theorem 2, and an analogue for the state Z = z a . We claim that the proposed strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium for n large enough. From the proof of Theorem 2, each t ype-1 voter is playing a best response to the other voters' strategies. With respect to voters of type k 1, they are playing a best response if q k PfpivjZ = z c gfsjz c P fZ = z c g r k PfpivjZ = z a gfsjz a P fZ = z a g for every s 2 S. Rearranging this expression, the de nitions of and , and r 1 =q 1 r k =q k for k 1, we obtain the desired conclusion.
Of the additional assumptions imposed in this section, continuity is generally necessary for existence of nontrivial equilibria. There always exist trivial equilibria in which two or more voters vote to acquit regardless of their signals because each of them knows that someone else is doing the same, so the defendant is acquitted regardless of the state. Extending Theorems 2 and 3 to an in nite numb e r o f t ypes or more than two states requires adding more structure to the preferences and information system of voters in order to ensure that best responses can still be written as cuto strategies. ; s 2 0; 1:
Similarly, let fsjz a be a beta density with parameters a ; a 0. The increasing likelihood ratio assumption implies that c a , c a , with at least one of the two inequalities holding strictly. The clear evidence condition holds except in the case c = a .
A Numerical Exercise
Consider the beta model with parameters c = a = 4 and c = a = 1.
There is a type of voters who prefer to convict regardless of the state type 0, and a type of voters who prefer to acquit in state z a and to convict in state z c type 1. Both states are equally likely ex ante, and r 1 =q 1 = 1, so that type-1 voters experience equal disutility from both mistakes, acquitting in state z c or convicting in state z a . There are 12 voters, of which n 1 are of type 1 and 12 , n 1 are of type 0. Table 1 below shows the probability of a mistaken decision conditional on the two states for di erent values of n 1 . The second column shows the cuto strategy followed by type-1 voters in equilibrium. Type-0 voters vote to convict all the time. Consistent with the theoretical development in the previous section, the equilibrium cuto for type-1 voters converges to S = 0 . We can see that, as the numberof type-1 voters increases, the probability of a mistaken decision declines noticeably. Table 2 below shows the probabilities of mistakes for the voting rule that maximizes the expected payo for type-1 voters. This is equivalent to minimizing the sum of the probabilities of mistakes. A rule is now described by the numberm of votes it requires to convict. Unanimity is then characterized by m = 12. To compute probabilities for rules other than unanimity, w e derive a symmetric cuto equilibrium strategy from an expression similar to equation 2 for m 12 , n 1 : Fs n;m
The second column now shows the optimal rule for type-1 voters, and the third column their equilibrium cuto strategy. Considering that type-0 voters always vote to convict, for type-1 voters the optimal rule is the one that requires n 1 + 1 =2 v otes from type-1 voters to convict if n 1 is odd and either n 1 =2 o r n 1 + 2 =2 v otes from type-1 voters if n 1 is even we report the second case in the table. That is, simple majority among type-1 voters is the optimal voting rule. The equilibrium cuto for type-1 voters under the optimal rule is 1 2 if n 1 is oddand approximately 1=2 if n 1 is even. The reason is that, in this example, fsjz c = f1 , sjz a for s 2 S; S = 0; 1, and type-1 voters are equally concerned about both mistakes.
Note that convergence to the perfect information outcome is much faster under the optimal voting rule than under unanimity. However, for n 1 small enough, every rule characterized by a xed m other than unanimity leads to conviction regardless of the state.
Related Literature and Discussion
Unanimous voting has received some attention after a provocative piece by Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998. In a setting in which a group of jurors with common preferences have two available signals, indicating that culpability or innocence of a defendant is more likely, they show that requiring unanimity to convict the defendant performs worse than other voting rules and fails to exhibit convergence to the complete information outcome. The example produced by Feddersen and Pesendorfer does not satisfy the clear evidence condition described in this paper. In fact, the condition cannot be satis ed if there is only a nite number of imperfect signals available to voters. We take this as an indication that a nite number of signals is an inappropriate assumption. The numerical example in section 5 illustrates that convergence may be relatively fast under unanimous voting. But it also illustrates the point that majority rule dominates unanimity if voters have common preferences and show equal concern for both types of mistakes. Unanimity rule makes sense in the example only as a way to make sure that the viewpoint of a minority is respected.
The model in section 4 extends the work of Duggan and Martinelli 1998 to the case of heterogeneous preferences. Meirowitz 1999 o ers another model with continuous signals and common preferences. Common preferences does not seem to be the right assumption to discuss unanimity rule: unanimity rule seems unlikely to bethe optimal voting rule in the sense of maximizing the expected utility of a group of like-minded voters. Li, Rosen, and Suen 1999 consider a model with continuous signals and heterogenous preferences, but they restrict their attention to a two-member committee.
Of some relevance for the current paper, Li et al. show that con icts of interests among the members of the committee preclude the use of reports de ned on an arbitrarily ne partition of the information available. This provides a foundation for the use of voting rules, which require of each v oter only a report on a two-partition of the set of possible signals. On a related matter, with a small electorate, it makes sense to ask whether the results are sensitive t o i n troducing a round of debate before voting. Earlier work by Austen-Smith 1990 shows that debate can have e ects on information aggregation by a committee only if the distribution of preferences with respect to outcomes is narrow.
Other recent research on the jury problem includes the work of Chwe 1999 on non-anonymous decision rules that maximize the utility o f a type of voter in the majority, and the work of Persico 1999 on information acquisition by voters.
More generally, this paper is related to the literature on information aggregation in elections; some references are Young 1988, Austen-Smith and Banks 1996, and Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997. Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997, in particular, provide convergence results for non-unanimous voting rules. They impose a bound on how good a signal might b e i n distinguishing between di erent circumstances, and show that convergence to the perfect information outcome is obtained along a sequence of equilibria, even though only a vanishing fraction of voters vote according to their private information their setup includes a continuum of types. In contrast, the current paper shows that unboundedness is a necessary condition for convergence to the perfect information outcome under unanimity rule. With an unbounded likelihood ratio, every voter other than those of type 0 votes according to their private information even as n grows large. With a bounded likelihood ratio, only approximate convergence can hold, and for large enough n only the more lenient voters vote to acquit or to convict according to the signal they receive.
Last, but most importantly, this paper is related to the literature on information aggregation in auctions: Wilson 1977 , Milgrom 1981, Pesendorfer and Swinkels 1997, and in particular Milgrom 1979. The model described in section 2 is a recasting of that of Milgrom 1979 in the context of unanimous voting; the proof of necessity in section 3 but not that of su ciency follows his proof closely. While a requirement equivalent to clear evidence is necessary and su cient for convergence to the true value in the case of a single-prize auction, in the case of unanimous voting it is only su cient for convergence conditional on the right" decision being A. Voting imposes upon voters a coordination problem, and unanimous voting puts all the burden of the coordination problem on the decision to select C.
